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McCready v. McCready and 
Domingues v. Johnson: COURT OF 
APPEALS REVIEWS STANDARD 
FOR MODIFYING CUSTODY OR-
DERS. 
Cutting a path through an over-
grown garden of intennediary appel-
late court precedent, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland clarified the law 
regarding changes in custody in 
McCreadyv. McCready, 593 A2d 1128 
(Md. 1991) and Domingues v. John-
son, 593 A.2d 1133 (Md. 1991). The 
court held that when a change in cus-
tody is sought, a trial court should not 
wait for an adverse effect on the child 
to occur but should instead decide 
whether the change in circumstances 
might in the future prove harmful to 
the child. 
In McCready, the parties had agreed 
to joint legal and physical custody of 
their daughter, Erin. The agreement 
specified a schedule for the shared 
physical custody. Several months af-
ter the order confinning the agreement 
was entered, the mother, Barbara 
McCready, filed a complaint for di-
vorce and pennanent custody of Erin. 
Mrs. McCready claimed a change in 
custody was necessary because her 
employment schedule had changed 
from weekends to weekdays and that 
joint physical custody was causing the 
child to experience stress and confu-
sion. In his answer, the father, Timo-
thy McCready, admitted that the joint 
physical custody had not proven ben-
eficial to the child, but stated that it 
would be in Erin's best interests to 
have primary custody granted to him. 
The trial judge agreed with the father 
and granted him primary physical cus-
tody. 
On appeal, the mother presented 
two arguments, the most important 
being that the ''best interest of the 
child" standard should be replaced by 
an inquiry into whether evidence ex-
isted showing a material change in 
circumstances affecting the welfare of 
the child. The court ofappeals granted 
certiorari on its own motion from the 
mother's appeal to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
used McCready to explain that the 
interaction between the concepts of 
''best interest ofthe child" and "mate-
rial change in circumstances." In any 
change of custody dispute, proof of a 
change in circumstances is ordinarily 
required. McCready, 593 A2dat 1130. 
The requirement of proof serves to 
prohibit parents from relitigating ques-
tions of custody and to afford finality 
in custody orders. Id. The court noted 
that there will frequently be some evi-
dence of changes which have occurred 
since the earlier custody detennination 
was made. Id. at 1131. Detennining 
whether those changes warrant a change 
in cUstody "necessarily requires a con-
sideration of the best interest of the 
child." Id. The court resolved the 
confusion between the two concepts 
by categorizing the question of 
"changed circumstances" as a thresh-
old question to the "best interest" de-
tennination. Id. 
The court next considered the 
mother's second argument that the 
chancellor's decision to modify physi-
cal custody was erroneous. Id. The 
court stated that it "will not set aside 
factual findings made by the chancel-
lor unless clearly erroneous, and we 
will not interfere with a decision re-
garding custody that is founded upon 
sound legal principles unless there is a 
clearshowingthatthe chancellor abused 
his discretion." Id. The court reviewed 
the chancellor' s findings and concluded 
that he had not abused his broad discre-
tion. Id. at 1132. 
In an opinion decided the same day 
as McCready, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland reviewed a similar case, 
Domingues v. Johnson, 593 A,2d 1133 
(Md. 1991). In Domingues, the parties 
had joint legal custody but the mother 
had primary physical custody. The 
mother remarried and wished to relo-
cate to Texas with the parties' children. 
She petitioned the court for a change in 
the father's visitation schedule which 
had been set forth in a prior court order. 
The father cross-petitioned for sole 
custody. After an extensive hearing, a 
domestic relations master found 
changes in circumstances, including: 
1) the remarriage ofthe mother and her 
removal with the children to Texas; 2) 
interference with the relationship be-
tween the father and his children by the 
mother's new husband; 3) the failure 
ofthe mother to communicate with the 
father with respect to the children; and 
4) the failure of the mother to encour-
age an appropriate relationship between 
the father and his children. Id. at 1135. 
Accordingly, the master awarded pri-
mary custody to the father. 
The mother'S exceptions to the 
master's finding were heard by a chan-
cellor, but no additional testimony was 
taken. Satisfied with the master's find-
ing, the chancellor overruled the ex-
ceptions and entered an order imple-
menting the recommendations made 
by the master. 
On appeal, the court of special ap-
peals reversed, holding that the chan-
cellor improperly applied the ''best in-
terests ofthe child" standard when he 
should have instead determined 
whether there was sufficient evidence 
of a change in circumstances affecting 
the welfare ofthe children. Id. at 1134. 
The intennediate appellate court deter-
mined that the mother's remarriage 
and move to Texas constituted changes 
in circumstances, but because neither 
of those circumstances had any de-
monstrable adverse effect on the chil-
dren as ofthe hearing date, they could 
not be considered changes in circum-
stances affecting the welfare of the 
children. Id. at 1138. Therefore, the 
court decided, the mother should have 
been granted custody. Id. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
reiterating its holding in McCready, 
reversed the court of special appeals. 
The court detennined "[t ] hat the (court 
of special appeals') view of'change' is 
unduly restrictive" and that proofthat 
change has already caused identifiable 
harm to the children is not necessary 
before a custody order can be modi-
fied. Id. Instead, the court found ''that 
it is sufficient if the chancellor finds 
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that changes have occurred which, 
when considered with all other rel-
evant circumstances, required that a 
change in custody be made to accom-
modate the future best interest of the 
children" Id. at 1139. The court ac-
knowledged that "[a] determination of 
custody requires an element ofpredic-
tion" and that it is "neither necessary 
nor desirable" to wait until a child is 
harmed to make a custody change. Id. 
The court also examined the rela-
tionship between a master's recom-
mendations and a chancellor's judge-
ment. In particular, the court was 
troubled by the chancellor's failure to 
exercise independent judgment after 
subjecting the master's fact-finding to 
a clearly erroneous test. The court 
called the burden on chancellors "sub-
stantial," and the court emphasized 
that while consideration may and 
should be given to a master's recom-
mendations, the final decision must be 
that of the chancellor's. Id. at 1135, 
1138. ''That the conclusions ... ofthe 
master are well supported by the evi-
dence is not dispositive ifthe indepen-
dent exercise of judgment by the chan-
cellor on those issues would produce a 
different result," explained the court. 
Id. at 1135. 
The McCready and Domingues 
opinions should provide fresh guid-
ance for change-in-custody cases. The 
decisions affirmed that the standard for 
modification of custody orders is the 
''best interests ofthe child." Addition-
ally, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
clearly stated that a child need not have 
been adversely affected before a chance 
in custody can occur. Finally, the 
court's emphasis on the chancellor's 
duty to exercise independent judgment 
forces trial judges to take procedural 
steps to avoid the appearance of rub-
ber-stamping the recommendations of 
masters. 
- Catherine E. Head 
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Murphyv. Edmonds: MARYLAND'S 
STATUTORY CAPON NONECO-
NOMIC DAMAGES IN PER-
SONAL INJURY CASES IS CON-
STITUTIONAL AND NEITHER 
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS NOR 
DENIES RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL. 
In Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 
102 (Md. 1992), the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland upheld the State's statu-
tory cap on noneconomic damages in 
personal injury cases as constitutional. 
Using the least burdensome test in 
analyzing the Courts & Judicial Pro-
ceedings article, section 11-108 ofthe 
Maryland Code, the court found that 
the law was rationally related to the 
State's purpose and did not violate the 
equal protection clause of the constitu-
tion. The court's ruling also means 
that limiting a jury's award with a 
noneconomic damages cap does not 
violate an individual's constitutional 
right to a jury trial. In justifying it's 
position, the court proclaimed its def-
erence to the legislature in removing 
the issue from the judiciary and enact-
ing the cap with legislation. 
Sarah Murphy was involved in an 
automobile accident while driving on 
1-83 in Baltimore. The defendants' tire 
blew out and his truck ran across the 
median striking Ms. Murphy, causing 
her serious injuries. Ms. Murphy and 
her husband filed a complaint in Balti-
more County Circuit Court for com-
pensatory and punitive damages. The 
jury awarded the Murphys $510,000 in 
noneconomic damages. The defen-
dants filed post trial motions request-
ing that the noneconomic damages be 
reduced to the statutory amount of 
$350,000 as provided in section 11-
108. 
The plaintiffs, however, argued that 
section 11-108 violated the equal pro-
tection guarantee embodied in the Due 
Process Clause found in article 24 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
The trial court ruled that the statute 
limited an important right, and there-
fore, the statute would have to pass the 
heightened scrutiny test. Id. at 106. 
The judge found the statute failed 
heightened scrutiny and therefore up-
held the jury award. 
The court of special appeals re-
versed the trial court's holding in 
Edmonds v. Murphy, 573 A.2d 853 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). There, the 
court found that there was no impor-
tant right which the statute was limit-
ing and, determined that as such, sec-
tion 11-108 was rationally related to 
the State's goal of economic regula-
tion and thus constitutional. . 
The plaintiffs appealed to the court 
of appeals on two issues: 1) that the 
classification created by section Il-
108 violated the equal protection guar-
antee of article 24 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights, and 2) that sec-
tion 11-108 infringes upon the right to 
ajurytrial under articles 5and23 ofthe 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
The court began its analysis on the 
premise that equal protection as ad-
dressed in Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and ar-
ticle 24 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights was the same concept for ana-
lytical purposes. Opinions of the 
United States Supreme Court dealing 
with the Equal Protection Clause ofthe 
Fourteenth Amendment were there-
fore viewed by the court of appeals as 
''practically direct authorities." Id. at 
1 08 (citing Attorney General v. 
Waldron, 426 A.2d 929 (1981». 
The plaintiffs argued that section 
11-108 created two classes of people 
when damages were awarded under 
this statute. One group, composed of 
those who were less seriously injured, 
got to keep the entire jury award, while 
the other group, those who were more 
seriously injured, did not. Such classi-
fication, the plaintiffs argued, was in 
violation ofthe equal protection guar-
antee of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. 
In addressing the plaintiffs' claim, 
the court discussed the three different 
standards of review for classifications 
chaJlenged under the equal protection 
guarantees. The least restrictive stan-
dard of review was the rational basis 
